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Abstract 
We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. 
Inequality aversion theories predict either no effect or a decrease in giving, whereas impure 
altruism theory predicts an increase in giving with an increase in the common income of 
donor and receiver. Theoretical predictions being contradictory, we run a dictator game in 
which we vary the common show-up fee of both the dictator and the recipient, while keeping 
an extra amount to be shared the same. The results are in line with the prediction of the 
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1. Introduction. 
 The literature on social preferences, since its inception, has displayed a significant 
interest in understanding altruism – defined as the principle or practice of concern for the 
welfare of others. Both theoretical and experimental studies continue to analyze and explain 
the possible components that affect altruistic decisions. It is intuitive that along with other 
factors, one’s altruistic behavior can be influenced by income effects. Except a few recent 
developments, the existing literature, however, has abstracted away from this issue. 
Specifically, how altruistic behavior is affected by a change in income – that has no effect on 
inequality – has never been investigated. In this paper we aim to fill this gap. We modify 
relevant existing theoretical models and run a simple dictator game to answer this question. It 
turns out that in cases where inequality is not salient, income effects are explained with 
impure altruism. 
In a standard dictator game a subject (the dictator) decides how much money to 
allocate between himself and another passive subject (the recipient). Both the dictator and the 
recipient are given a show-up fee, and the dictator is then asked to divide an extra amount 
between himself and the recipient. It is observed that a substantial proportion of dictators 
allocate a non-trivial share (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003; List 
and Cherry, 2008; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). Since its introduction in the present form, 
this game has often been used to understand altruism, as the dictator does not otherwise have 
any incentive to share the money with the recipient. Altruism and social preference theories 
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006) such as 
pure altruism (Becker, 1974), inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000), impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) and conditional altruism (Konow, 
2010) explain this seemingly non-rational behavior of dictators. Whereas pure altruism 
assumes that the donor gets utility purely from the well-being of the receivers, inequality 
aversion theories hypothesize that donors incur disutility from inequality and that, in turn, 
motivates altruism. Impure altruism theory, on the other hand, hypothesize that donors incur 
utility from the wellbeing of the recipient, but also earn a ‘warm-glow’ utility from the giving 
itself. Conditional altruism theory, in addition, incorporates social norms and includes social 
preference theories. Please see Konow (2010) for a broader discussion and comparison of 
each of these theories. 
We are interested in analyzing the relationship between a pure income effect and 
altruism, and in understanding the underlying theoretical mechanism behind the relationship. 
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To study this in a dictator game, one needs to vary the common show-up fee equally for both 
the dictator and the recipient. Interestingly enough, the effects of show-up fees in dictator 
game has seldom been the focus of analyses.
1
 Whereas a small number of existing studies are 
interested in understanding the effects of show-up fee inequality (between the dictator and the 
recipient) on altruism, this particular design has never been studied in the literature. In this 
study, in different treatments we vary a show-up fee common to both the dictator and the 
recipient (£0.5, £5, £10, £15, and £20), but keep an extra amount (£10)  – that is to be 
allocated by the dictator – the same across treatments. This frame is also a stylized 
representation of situations in which an economic agent has the opportunity to be generous to 
another agent of the same social or income stratum – be it rich to rich, or poor to poor. It 
resembles circumstances in the field such as sending remittances to family of similar income 
status (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006), comparison of local charities in high income and low 
income geographical areas (countries or states), family transfers (Laferrere and Wolff, 2006), 
inter-generational benevolent behavior such as behaving in an eco-friendly manner to leave a 
better environment for future generations (Popp, 2001) etc.  
Theoretical and behavioral predictions of this framing can be derived from the 
standard social preference theories and from the observations in the meta-analysis of Engel 
(2010). In the course of this paper we derive that the inequality aversion theories suggest a 
non-increasing and sometimes strictly decreasing relationship between the common show-up 
fee and dictator giving, whereas the impure altruism theory suggests the opposite. Combining 
the existing experimental studies, Engel (2010, pp. 595), in his meta-analysis, observes  
“In the standard dictator game, the recipient is poor while the 
dictator is rich. If the recipient also receives an endowment upfront … 
this strongly reduces giving… if the recipient has received a positive 
endowment at the start of the interaction, the reduction is almost 
perfectly proportional to the size of the endowment...”  
Complying with the impure altruism theory, and contrasting with the inequality aversion 
theories (or the results stated in the meta-analysis above), we observe a monotone increase in 
dictator giving with an increase in the common show-up fee.  
                                                             
1 Income/endowment effect in the ultimatum game (Knetsch, 1989; Bolton et al., 1998; Armantier, 2006) is well 
observed. In dictator game, dictators are more self-interested if they earn the amount to be allocated, and are 
more generous if recipients earn it (Ruffle, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). The stake of 
giving also exhibits a significant effect on giving behavior (List and Cherry, 2008; Johansson-Stenman et al., 
2005; Carpenter et al., 2005). The effect of different initial split of the pie has also been investigated (starting 
with Bolton and Katok, 1998) and it is found that with higher initial share to the recipient, dictator giving 
decreases. However, only Konow (2010) and Korenok et al. (2012) explicitly introduce the saliency of show-up 
fees in a dictator game. 
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This analysis is closely related to the research by Korenok et al. (2012). They employ 
a strategy method in which each dictator makes eight decisions for varying show-up fees. 
When the show-up fee of the dictators is constant but that of the recipients’ increase from 
zero to the same amount of dictator’s, dictators steadily decrease the amount passed to the 
recipients. It is concluded, hence, that the main motivation of altruism is other-regarding 
preferences and not warm-glow. This is extended in Korenok et al. (2013). Introducing a 
price of giving and an endowment to the recipient, they show that a vast majority of the 
behavior of the dictator can be explained with a theory of impure altruism. The current study 
is also related to the idea of conditional altruism (Konow, 2010) that incorporates disutility 
out of deviation from moral norms, and effects similar to warm-glow that relates to long term 
utility such as prestige or social approval. Konow (2010) employs a subsidy frame among 
others and shows, again, that the recipient show-up fee has significant effects on the dictator 
giving. He concludes support for conditional altruism.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
We ran 5 treatments with 3 sessions under each treatment. 16 subjects participated in 
each session. All the subjects were students at the University of East Anglia, UK, recruited 
through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Our design is a variant of the 
Forsythe et al. (1994) Dictator game. The only difference is that the subjects were given a 
common show-up fee and that was common and salient knowledge. The treatments differed 
only in the show-up fees given to the subjects. Dictators were then given an additional £10 
and were allowed the choice to allocate the additional amount between him/herself and 
his/her co-participant (i.e., the recipient). Table 1 summarizes the treatment description. 
Table 1. Treatment description 
Treatment 
Common 
show-up 
fee 
Additional 
amount to        
be divided 
Number of 
subjects per 
session 
Number of 
sessions 
Number of 
independent  
observations 
Treatment 1 £0.50 £10 16 3 24 
Treatment 2 £5 £10 16 3 24 
Treatment 3 £10 £10 16 3 24 
Treatment 4 £15 £10 16 3 24 
Treatment 5 £20 £10 16 3 24 
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Although our designs are similar, there also are several differences between Korenok 
et al. (2012) or Konow (2010) and the current study. First, the existing studies focus on the 
effects of the dictator-recipient show-up fee difference on dictator giving, but our focus is on 
the effect of the change in common show-up fee on dictator giving. Thus, whereas those 
frames are appropriate to study giving behavior when inequality is salient, ours is more 
appropriate to understand the impact of a pure income effect on altruism. We employ a 
between-subject design, whereas Korenok et al. (2012) use a strategy method. Our design 
also differs with that of Konow (2010) in terms of decision space, and we find that the 
experimental results can be explained by the theory of impure altruism. 
In each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into one of 8 pairs 
and were assigned the role of either a dictator or a recipient. They then received information 
about their show-up fees, which was the same for all participants in a particular session. Each 
session consisted of two parts. In the first part, dictators were asked to allocate the additional 
£10 between themselves and the recipient, up to a fraction of 1 penny. In the second part, 
recipients had to guess the amount they would receive from the dictator. The instruction of 
the second part was given only after the decisions of the first part were made, and it was 
mentioned beforehand, in the instruction of the first part, that recipient’s decision is payoff 
irrelevant to the dictator. This was done to ensure no strategic interaction between dictators’ 
choices with recipient’s guesses. Demographic information such as age, gender, nationality, 
study area of each participating subjects were collected after the experiment. The experiment 
was run manually and each subject’s decision was anonymous to the experimenters. Subjects 
could participate in only one session. On average, each session took about 45 minutes and the 
average earnings of subjects (dictator and recipient together) across treatments were £15.10. 
However, average earnings varied over treatments between £5.5 (Treatment 1) and £25 
(Treatment 5). The instructions are included in the Appendix. 
3.   Theoretical predictions 
 In this section we derive analytical predictions regarding dictator giving with the 
theories of inequality aversion and impure altruism, proofs of which are given in the 
Appendix. We also briefly discuss the theory of pure altruism, and compare the results of 
conditional altruism with impure altruism theory, but do not provide corresponding proofs. 
According to the theory of pure altruism (Becker, 1984; Andreoni, 1989), the utility 
of a donor depends only on the final payoffs of himself and the receiver. However, the 
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predictions of this model are often not clear. In the current context, it can easily be shown 
that the pure altruism theory does not provide a specific prediction for an income effect. 
Giving may stay the same, go up, or go down as a result of an increase in the common show-
up fees. Moreover, the predictions of the pure altruism theory are tested and rejected in the 
literature by Andreoni (1993) and several others over the course of time; and hence we focus 
on the alternative theories in the current study. 
3.1. Linear form inequality aversion 
Inequality aversion theories capture the preference of the agents for fairness and 
defiance to inequality. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest a linear model of inequality 
aversion in which a donor’s utility decreases with the difference in donor and receiver 
payoff. For a two-player case, this model can be described as 
                                [       ]       [       ]                           (1) 
Where    is the utility of subject i;        are payoffs of i and j respectively; and       are 
inequality aversion parameters with                 . Let    and    be the show-up 
fees and    and    be the allocations of the pie,  , for a dictator and a recipient respectively. 
Hence,         ,           and         . We further impose        . For a 
common show-up fee          Lemma 1 states the predicted relationship between the 
equilibrium amount given and the show-up fee. Figure 1 summarizes this in a diagram.  
Proposition 1. According to the hypothesis of the linear form inequality aversion, the amount 
given remains the same across treatments  
   
 
  
   . 
Figure 1. Show-up fee- Dictator giving relationship: Linear form inequality aversion  
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3.2. Ratio form inequality aversion  
 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)’s ratio form model assumes a decrease in donor’s utility 
with the asymmetry in the ratio in donor and receiver payoff. Following the same notation as 
earlier, for a two-player case with        , this model turns out to be 
                     [              2]
 
       (2) 
Where      and      are inequality aversion parameters,         ,         and 
       . Proposition 2 and Figure 2 summarize the show-up fee – giving relationship. 
Figure 2. Show-up fee-Dictator giving relationship: Ratio form inequality aversion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 2. According to the hypothesis of the ratio form inequality aversion, the dictator 
gives a positive amount at zero common show-up fees. However, giving decreases with an 
increase in the show-up fee  
   
 
  
   , until a point after which the dictator keeps the whole 
amount for himself. 
3.3. The theory of Impure Altruism 
The theory of impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) considers dictator utility with 
components of own wellbeing, wellbeing of the recipient, and a warm-glow component (that 
reflects the joy of giving) through the amount given. For two players, specify this model as 
                       (                )          (3) 
Assume that the utility function       to be strictly quasi-concave and strictly 
increasing in all arguments. Proposition 3 and Figure 3 describe the derived relationship 
between equilibrium giving and the common show-up fee for this model.  
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Proposition 3. According to the theory of impure altruism an increase in the show-up fee 
strictly increases dictator giving  
   
 
  
   . 
Figure 3. Show-up fee-Dictator giving relationship: Impure altruism 
 
 
 
 
 
It is to be noted that the prediction of a positive relationship between the dictator 
giving and the common show-up fees can also be derived from models introduced later in the 
literature with structure similar or richer to the theory of impure altruism. Here we discuss 
one of such richer models. The theory of conditional altruism (Konow, 2010) considers moral 
norms in donor decisions and also provides a refined structure of effects that a warm-glow 
component supposed to capture. When the moral norm is considered to be the half of the total 
wealth, then under         the utility function should be  
     (      )    (     
 
2
 2    )    (  ) 
Where the first component of the function represents own wellbeing, the last component is 
the warm-glow part, and the middle one shows disutility coming through the deviation of 
recipient’s payoffs from the moral norm. It is easy to show that under appropriate 
assumptions this model’s prediction is qualitatively similar to Proposition 3, and we do not 
provide a formal proof of the same.  
4. Results 
As the treatments are run between-subjects, there are 24 independent observations in 
each treatment. We run standard non-parametric tests and regressions to assess the conflicting 
hypotheses arising from the theoretical models.  
We start with Table 2, which describes the mean and median of giving in each 
treatment. It also shows the number of subjects giving zero and giving £5 as a measure of 
pure selfish or pure egalitarian behavior. Only one subject in the whole experiment allocated 
more than £5 to a recipient. The proportion of pure selfish subjects varies between 12.5% to 
around 20%, whereas the proportion of egalitarian subjects varies from 4% to 1/3 over 
yj 
𝐹 
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treatments. If we consider giving less than £1, too, as selfish behavior, then the total number 
of selfish subjects goes up to 32, and becomes 42% in the 50p treatment. Given the sessions 
were run manually, these observations are in line with the results from the existing 
experiments (Engel, 2010).  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of amount given: total 
 Show-up fee  
# of obs: 120 0.5 5 10 15 20 Total 
Mean 1.59 2.12 2.44 2.66 3.12 2.39 
Median 1.25 2 2.25 3 3.50 2 
Zero 5 5 5 3 3 21 
0<giving<half 18 15 14 15 12 74 
Half 1 4 5 6 8 24 
 
Figure 4. Show-up fee - amount given scatter plot 
 
One immediate observation from Table 2 is that the central tendency of the amount 
given is steadily increasing with an increase in the show-up fee. This is true for both mean 
and median giving. Figure 4, showing the scatter plot of giving with the average giving per 
treatment, further supports this observation. However, it is still to be confirmed if this 
increase in giving is statistically significant.  
To test the same, we first run non-parametric tests on the hypothesis of same 
distribution of amount given over different show-up fees. This hypothesis is rejected at 10% 
level with a Kruskal and Wallis (1952) test. Moreover, with two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann and Whitney, 1947) tests it is rejected that giving in treatments with high show-up 
fees is same as giving in treatments with lower show-up fees. 
To test whether the increase in amount given across treatments is significant and 
robust to other controls, we first run a linear regression with amount given as the dependent 
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variable and show-up fee as the explanatory variable. The first column in Table 3 shows the 
result of the regression. The coefficient for show-up fee is positive and significant at 1% level. 
It shows that a £1 increase in show-up fee increases giving by 7.3 pence on average. In the 
second model we control for gender, nationality and study areas but show-up fee remains 
significant with similar impact (6.8 pence increase in giving for a £1 increase in the show-up 
fee). Out of all the control variables only gender turns out to be significant and females on 
average are more generous than their male counterparts. Because almost a sixth of the 
dictators gave nothing, the third and fourth regressions are run with a left-censored Tobit 
model.
2
 However, the direction and significance of the results still remain the same. 
Table 3. Regression of amount given on show-up fee, gender and other controls 
Dependent variable 
:amount given 
(Linear 1) (Linear 2) (Tobit 1) (Tobit 2) 
Intercept 1.647*** 1.563**    1.366***   1.352    
 
(0.293) (0.765) (0.350) (0.889) 
Show-up Fee 0.073*** 0.068***    0.082*** 0.076***    
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
Female 
 
0.745**     0.873**    
  
(0.338)  (0.393) 
Age 
 
-0.007      -0.012     
  
(0.024)  (0.028) 
UK Dummy 
 
0.034     0.057    
  
(0.355)  (0.413) 
Econ Dummy 
 
-0.127     -0.119    
  
(0.563)  (0.652) 
# of Observations 120 120 120 120 
Adjusted R
2
 0.066 0.076 0.017 0.028 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***,** and * indicates significance at the  1%, 5%, and 10% level 
The results confirm that the average amount given increases robustly with the 
common show-up fee. Other variations of the controls (such as other country / study area 
dummies, age brackets, interaction variables), non-linear effects of the show-up fee, and other 
regression procedures such as a hurdle-model (Mullahy, 1986) did not come out to be 
significant, did not change the direction of the results and hence are not reported. In 
                                                             
2 The reported values under the Tobit regressions are the coefficients, i.e., the marginal effects on the latent 
dependent variable. The signs are the same for the marginal effects on the expected values. 
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conclusion, a pure income effect – with no implication on income inequality – positively 
affects altruism. This result is in contradiction with Propositions 1 and 2, but not with 
Proposition 3. Hence, we conclude that the consequence of pure income effect on giving can 
be explained by the theory of impure altruism.  
5. Discussion  
We investigate how a pure income effect influences altruistic behavior. In a dictator 
game we vary the common show-up fee of the dictator and the recipient, but keep the amount 
to be shared the same. Contrary to the predictions of the standard inequality aversion models 
and derived results from existing experiments, but in line with the theory of impure altruism, 
the dictators give more with an increase in the common show-up fee. 
If our results from the laboratory generalize to the world at large, then we would 
expect charity donations to be significantly lower at the time of a recession.
3
 In addition, 
according to our results, (ceteris paribus) one would expect a higher amount of overall charity 
giving within a richer country compared to a poorer country, more family transfers within 
wealthier families compared to poorer families, and citizens from the richer countries to be 
more eco-friendly than their poorer counterparts (supporting the empirical observation by 
Popp (2001) about impure inter-generational altruism in terms of environmental issues). The 
current study is also in line with the result obtained by Holland et al. (2012) in their 
Anthropology field experiment. They left sealed and stamped letters in the streets of 50 
neighborhoods in London and found that the likelihood of someone posting the letter in a 
nearby mailbox is positively correlated with the income-level of the neighborhood. Finally, 
the current results match, in spirit, with the empirical observation by Hoffmann (2011). He 
finds that even after controlling for various factors including abilities, richer German citizens 
saved more Jews people at the time of the holocaust compared to the poorer German citizens. 
The main result of our analysis is of interest because existing experimental results to 
date (such as Korenok et al., 2012 and Konow, 2010) have shown that in a standard dictator 
game, results can be explained with inequality aversion or conditional altruism theories. 
Crumpler and Grossman (2008) among others, on the other hand, have shown that impure 
altruism can explain results in dictator games with a charity frame. Our results imply that 
impure altruism theory can explain results even in a standard dictator game frame, when 
income inequality is less salient.  
                                                             
3  See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7946518.stm and the NCVO/CAF (2009) report on the effects of 
recession on charitable giving in the UK. Also see the Giving USA (2009) report regarding the same in the USA. 
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Finally, several studies (Bolton and Katok, 1998; Branas-Garza, 2006; Engel, 2010; 
Konow, 2010; Korenok et al., 2012) show that an increase in the recipient’s income marks a 
negative impact on the amount given by the dictator, and explain the same through inequality 
aversion. We observe that if the increase in recipient income is accompanied by an increase 
in dictator income, then it can even increase giving. Presenting it in another way, unlike the 
existing studies, we observe that the dictator may even give less to the recipient if the 
recipient (and common) income is lower. In many of the existing designs, the warm-glow 
part of impure altruism and the inequality aversion components work in opposite ways in 
determining giving. If one of the effects is made less salient then it is offset by the other 
effect and the outcome changes. Hence, to conclude, in some settings inequality aversion may 
serve as a better underlying model than impure altruism, whereas in some other settings 
impure altruism may fit better. While, as we find, impure altruism works better in explaining 
income effects, the scope for exhaustive investigations in this broader topic remains open. 
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Appendix I 
1. Linear form inequality aversion: Proof of Proposition 1  
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
               [               ]       [               ] 
                   [2      ]       [  2    ] 
The dictator would try to maximize utility with respect to the giving decision. There 
can be 2 cases: yj    2 and yj ≤   2. It is easy to show that the first case does not arise. 
Hence the dictator’s optimization problem boils down to: 
                       2    subject to   2       
Let  1  and    be Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian equation and the 
corresponding first order conditions are given below. 
              (  2  )   1     (  2    )   
   
   
    2    1               (5) 
   
   
       1      1      
   
   
 (  2    )           (  2    )     
Case a:  1        . This implies      2, i.e., the dictator is indifferent between giving 
any amount between 0 and Y 2. But the second order condition does not hold. 
Case b.  1   ,      and hence   2      . In this case dictator keeps the whole 
amount. The required condition from (4) is      2 .  
Case c.  1   ,      and hence     . Here the dictator gives   2 . The required 
condition for this is      2 .  
Consequently, the equilibrium    is independent of F. Therefore under Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) structure:  
   
 
  
  ; an increase in the common show-up fee does not have 
any effect on the giving behavior.             □ 
2. Ratio form inequality aversion: Proof of Proposition 2 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as 
     (      )    [(      ) [(    )  (      )]    2 ]
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The dictator would try to maximize    with respect to the giving decision (  ) subject 
to       . Denote  1        as Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian equation and the 
corresponding first order conditions are given below. 
     (      )    [
(      )
{(    )  (      )}
   2 ]
 
  1     (    ) 
   
   
  
   
       
yj  [  {
 
       
}    ]   1           (6) 
   
   
       1      1      
   
   
 (Y    )           (Y    )     
Case a.     ,  1    and hence     , i.e., the dictator gives nothing. From (6) observe 
that  1    implies    2    
       Hence, the required restriction becomes   
 [        
1   2   ]. 
Case b.  1   ,      and hence     , i.e., the dictator gives the whole pie. From (6) 
observe that      implies        (       )
 
   . This is not possible. 
Case c.   1        i.e., an interior solution. Solving we get    
1
   
[       2    
 ] 
 
1
 
  
  
   
 2     . Hence, this boils down to     
1
 
  
  
   
 2     , with required 
restrictions   (√          ) 2  and          . It is easy to check that the SOC holds. 
The equilibrium giving implies 
   
 
  
  ; i.e., an increase in the common show-up fee will 
result in a lower giving in the interior.           □ 
3. The theory of Impure Altruism: Proof of Proposition 3 
Following Andreoni (1989), define total payoff of the recipient as          . Then 
equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
     (                   ) 
Assuming interior solution, the optimum level of    can be solved by differentiating the 
above equation with respect to    and setting it equal to zero. Hence, the solution can be 
written as the following implicit function: 
     (          ) 
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Where the first argument reflects the altruism component and the second argument reflects 
the warm-glow component of the utility function. Subtracting    from both sides we get 
  
    (          )        (4) 
When both own consumption and charity are normal goods, then one can argue following 
Andreoni (1989, pp. 1451) that for the case of non-neutral transfers:   
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
  . 
Now differentiating (4) with respect to    we find: 
   
 
  
   1
   
  
   1
   
  
    
   
  
 
   
  
 
Where   1  is the partial derivative of the function    with its first argument, and     is the 
partial derivative for the second argument. So if both         , then 
   
  
 
   
  
  . Given 
this and imposing the condition     
   
   
  
   
   
  , we get: 
   
 
  
 2  1          
Hence,   
  is increasing in  ; i.e., an increase in the common show-up fee will result in a 
higher giving in the interior.             □ 
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APPENDIX II 
Instructions for the experiment (Baseline case: £10 participation fee) 
General Instruction 
This is an experiment in the area of economic decision making. Various research agencies 
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely, then 
depending on your decision and the decision of the others, you can earn an appreciable amount of 
money. The experiment has two parts. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private 
and in cash. Your identity and your decisions will also remain private. 16 participants are in today’s 
experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. 
We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
 
Your Decisions   
You have already received a £10.00 participation fee. This experiment contains the decision 
problem that requires you to make economic choices that determine your earnings over and above 
your participation fee. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into one 
of 8 groups (groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). Each group consists of 2 types of participants 
‘Participant A’ and ‘Participant B’. Again you will be randomly assigned either as a ‘Participant A’ 
or a ‘Participant B’ in your group. Both the group name and your type will be written in a card given 
to you at the start of the experiment. Other participants will not know your group number or your type 
(A or B). 
Both ‘Participant A’ and ‘Participant B’ are paid £10 each as their respective participation 
fee. Every Participant A will receive an additional amount of £10.  
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Part I. Participant A 
Participant A will make the decision to allocate this additional £10 between himself / herself 
and the Participant B in his/her group. Participant A can decide to give any amount in British Pounds, 
between 0.00 and 10.00 (up to two decimal points), to Participant B. Suppose Participant A gives X to 
Participant B. Then Participant A will have the remaining Y= £10.00 - X. The total earnings of 
Participant A will be the participation fee plus the share of the additional £10. Hence, earnings of 
Participant A = £10 + Y. Earnings of Participant B = £10 + X. See the following examples for 
clarification. All the numbers are in British Pounds: 
Example 1. Suppose Participant A decides to give 7.29 to Participant B. Then the total earnings of 
Participant B is (participation fee + share of the additional amount) = 10 + 7.29 = 17.29. And the total 
earnings of the Participant A is = 10 + (10 - 7.29) = 10 + 2.71 = 12.71. 
Example 2. Suppose Participant A decides to give 3.37 to Participant B. Then the total earnings of 
Participant B is (participation fee + share of the additional amount) = 10 + 3.37 = 13.37. And the total 
earnings of the Participant A is = 10 + (10 - 3.37) = 10 + 6.63 = 16.63. 
Every participant will get a card at the start of the experiment. Line 1 of the card indicates 
your group number. Line 2 indicates your role in the experiment. Line 3 shows your participation fee. 
Line 4 shows the participation fee of the other participant in your group. Line 5 shows the additional 
amount (£10.00) given to Participant A to be allocated between himself/herself and the Participant B 
in the same group. The next lines are different for Participant A and Participant B. 
Participant A’s card looks like the one given below. In Line 6, Participant A will write a 
number between £0.00 and £10.00 (up to 2 decimal points) in the blank space. This is the amount 
given to Participant B. In Line 7, Participant A will calculate the amount left for him/her. To calculate 
this, Participant A will subtract the amount written in line 6 from £10. Line 8 shows Participant A’s 
total earnings. This will be the participation fee plus the share of the additional £10. Hence, 
Participant A will add line 3 and line 7 and write the number in line 8. Finally, in line 9, 
Participant A calculates the total earnings of Participant B, which is the sum of line 4 and line 6.     
 
 
 
 
 
1. Your group number:   8 
2. Your role:  Participant A 
3. Your participation fee: £10  
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10 
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10 
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and 10.00):  X =______ 
7. Amount left for  you: £10 - X = ______ 
8. Your total earnings:  £10 + _____ = _____  
9. Participant B total earnings:  £10 + ____ = ____ 
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Here is an example that draws numbers from Example 1 in page 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is another example that draws numbers from Example 2 in page 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant A will get 2 minutes to make his/her decision. After making the decision, each 
Participant A will put his/her card inside the envelope given and seal the envelope.  
To summarize, if you are Participant A, make your decision and fill out the card. But if you 
are Participant B, you do not have to do anything in this part of the experiment. The total earnings of 
Participant A will be the sum of the participation fee, and the residual amount from the additional £10 
(after giving an amount to Participant B), as calculated in line 8. Participant A’s earnings will not be 
affected by the decisions of participant B in the next round. This will conclude the first part of the 
experiment. Are there any questions?  
 
 
 
 
1. Your group number:   8 
2. Your role:  Participant A 
3. Your participation fee: £10  
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10 
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10 
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and 10.00): X = £7.29 
7. Amount left for  you: £10 - X = £2.71 
8. Your total earnings:  £10 + £2.71 = £12.71  
9. Participant B total earnings:  £10 + £7.29  = £17.29 
1. Your group number:   8 
2. Your role:  Participant A 
3. Your participation fee: £10  
4. Participation fee of Participant B: £10 
5. Additional amount to be allocated: £10 
6. Amount given to Participant B (between 0.00 and 10.00): X = £3.37 
7. Amount left for  you: £10 - X = £6.63 
8. Your total earnings:  £10 + £6.63 = £16.63 
9. Participant B total earnings:  £10 + £3.37 = £13.37 
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Part II. Participant B 
Participant B’s card looks like the one given below. Line 6 indicates participant B’s guess 
about the amount offered to Participant B by Participant A. Line 7 shows the total guessed earnings of 
Participant B, which is the sum of line 3 and line 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous part of the experiment, Participant A decided to give any amount between 
£0.00 and £10.00 (up to two decimal points) to Participant B. In this part of the experiment, 
Participant B will have to guess the amount Participant A has given to him/her. If the guess is close 
enough to the actual amount given by Participant A, then Participant B will get an extra reward of £1.  
Suppose Participant A has given X to Participant B. Participant B guesses that the amount is 
Z. If the difference between X and Z is less than or equal to 50 Pence, then Participant B will get the 
£1 reward over and above the participation fee and the amount given by Participant A. 
Example 1. Suppose Participant A decides to give £7.29 to Participant B. If Participant B rightfully 
guesses an amount which is in between £6.79 and £7.79, then Participant B will get the reward of £1. 
This is because £7.29 - £0.5 = £6.79 and £7.29 + £0.5 = £7.79. If Participant B guesses numbers 
outside this range, then he/she will not get the reward. 
Example 2. Suppose Participant A decides to give £3.37 to Participant B. If Participant B rightfully 
guesses an amount which is in between £2.87 and £3.87, then Participant B will get the reward of £1. 
This is because £3.37 - £0.5 = £2.87 and £3.37 + £0.5 = £3.87. If Participant B guesses numbers 
outside this range, then he/she will not get the reward. 
Participant B will write the guess in Line 6. He/she will also need to write the total earnings 
in line 7. This will be the sum of line 3 and line 6. Participant B will get 2 minutes to make his/her 
decision. After making the decision, each Participant B will put his/her card inside the envelope given 
and seal the envelope. The total earnings of Participant B will be the sum of the participation fee, 
amount given to him/her by Participant A, and the £1 reward (if won). This will conclude the second 
part of the experiment. Are there any questions? 
1. Your group number:   8 
2. Your role:  Participant B 
3. Your participation fee: £10 
4. Participation fee of Participant A: £10 
5. Total amount to be divided: £10  
6. Your guess about the amount offered to you (between 0.00 and 10.00):    ____ 
7. Your guess about your total earnings:  £10  + ____ = ____  
